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Crisis States Programme 
 
Mineral Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict:  





Since the end of the Cold War, interest in analysing conflict in low and middle-income 
countries has expanded exponentially.1 The demise of the Cold War inspired a new search for 
the causes of conflict in poor economies since it could no longer be claimed that wars in late 
developing countries were the result of ‘external’ conflict between superpowers. There has 
been a proliferation of research agendas and labels for conflict, which include the study of 
‘civil wars’, ‘new wars’, intra-state conflicts, ‘complex emergenc ies’ and so on. 2 One of the 
more influential propositions of recent times is the so-called “resource curse” argument—the 
idea that abundance of natural resources causes poor growth, and raises the incidence, 
intensity and duration of conflict. While natural resource abundance has long been considered 
beneficial to economic and political development, the recent poor economic performance of 
oil exporters and the growing incidence of civil wars in mineral-rich economies has revived 
the idea that their resource abundance may be more of a curse than a blessing. The main 
model used to explain the mechanisms through which resource abundance generates negative 
outcomes is the rentier state model. The basic logic of this model is that large levels of 
natural resource rents relative to income generate disproportionate levels of rent-seeking. 
These supposedly increase the level of distributive conflicts, which increases both the 
incidence of civil war and levels of corruption. The rentier state model thus has two variants: 
first, mineral resource-rich late developers are more prone to violence; second, mineral-
dominant economies generate higher levels of corruption and lower rates of long-run growth.  
 
This paper critically examines the first variant of the rentier state model both on 
methodological and empirical grounds. The core argument of the first variant, which has been 
called “political Dutch Disease”, is that rentier state leaders, by relying on ‘unearned” income 
(in the form of mineral rents and/or aid), do not develop a set of reciprocal obligations with 
citizens via the nexus of domestic taxation. 3 The rentier state model has been useful in 
bringing issues of the source of taxation and resource mobilization back into a discussion of 
state capacity and accountability. The model also posits that the more leaders can finance 
state activities through ‘unearned’ income’, the more likely predatory behaviour, including 
violence, will follow. The policy implications that follow from this reasoning are that aid may 
fuel further violence and that natural resource (and particularly, mineral) extraction can 
promote violence in poor countries. Section 2 presents the main premises of the first variant 
of the rentier state model. Section 3 examines empirically the validity of the idea that 
                                                 
1 For review, see C. Cramer, ‘Angola and the Theory of War’, mimeo,  Department of Development Studies, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Cramer, C., ‘Homo Economicus Goes to War: 
Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War’, World Development, 30:11 
(2002b); De Soysa, ‘The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?, in M. Berdal and D. 
Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002a; De 
Soysa, ‘Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-1999’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 39:4 (2002b). 
2 Cramer (2002a), p.1. 
3 The economic concept of Dutch Disease refers to the potential negative effects natural resource windfalls and 
accompanying appreciations of exchange rates can have for the rest of the economy. One of the potential 
dangers of oil booms, for example, is that exchange rate appreciation renders the manufacturing sector less 
competitive and thus can generate de-industrialisation.  
 2
mineral-dominant poor economies generate significantly higher levels of political violence 
than non-mineral dominant poor economies. Section 4 provides a conclusion, suggestions for 
future research and some implications for policy.  
 
Rentier State and Political Violence 
 For the rentier state theorists, the classification of a rentier economy, or a rentier state as a 
unit of analysis, is based on the World Bank classification of a mineral economy. 4 From this 
perspective, a mineral economy is one where mineral production constitutes at least 10 
percent of gross domestic production and where mineral exports comprise at least 40 percent 
of total exports. In this classification, Venezuela, for instance, can be considered a rentier 
state, or what Karl calls a ‘petro-state’, throughout the period 1930-1995.5 Mineral rich 
economies are considered distinct and thus defensible as a separate category of analysis by 
rentier state theorists because these economies generate natural resource rents that emanate 
from ‘point’ resources rather than from ‘diffuse’ resources such as land under small farms. 
Point rents, according to Auty are associated with staples that are relatively capital- intensive 
and thereby concentrate ownership.6 ‘Point’ resources can include plantations where the crop 
requires immediate processing such as sugarcane. In contrast, where the staple or resource 
poses more modest investment barriers to entry, as with rice and maize, and some tree crops 
such as coffee and cocoa, the rents are likely to be more widely dispersed through the 
population. ‘Point’ resources are also similar in that they are ‘enclave’ industries in the sense 
that they generate fewer production, consumption and socio-economic linkages in poor 
economies than more ‘diffuse’ resources.7 Within this classification of point resource 
economies, oil economies are considered to be the proto-typical example.8 
 
The main premise of the rentier state model of governance is that when states gain a large 
proportion of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents, the reduced 
necessity of state decision-makers to levy domestic taxes causes leaders to be less 
accountable to individuals and groups within civil society. The theory of the rentier state 
develops two main strands. The first argument identifies a supposed mismatch between 
jurisdiction and authority, and develops the proposition that such a mismatch generates 
predatory states, greater distributional conflicts, and the militarization of politics, all of which 
increase the risk of civil war and humanitarian emergencies. The second argument is that the 
relatively higher level of rents generates greater levels of rent-seeking and corruption than in 
non-mineral economies.9  I will consider the first argument in this paper. 
                                                 
4 See Nankani, ‘Development Problems of Mineral Exporting Countries’, World Bank Staff Working Paper 354, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 1979. 
5 T.L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 
p.17-19. 
6 Auty (2000), p.6. 
7 A. Hirshman, ‘A generalized linkage approach to development, with special reference to staples’, in A. 
Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to politics and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981; R. M. Auty & A. H. Gelb, ‘Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States’, in R.M. Auty (ed.), 
Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.141. 
8 See Karl (1997), pp.17-19; Auty & Gelb (2001). 
9 The rentier state models  are also part of a growing trend of reviving the ‘staples thesis’—the notion that 
natural factor endowments or technology shape the relations of production, or institutional evolution of a society 
(see S. Engerman & K. L. Sokoloff, ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths to Growth Among 
New World Economies: A View from  Economic Historians in the United States’, in S. Haber (ed.),  How Latin 
America Fell Behind, Stanford: Stanford Un iversity Press, 1997; Karl (1997);  Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB), Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America  
1998-1999 Report, Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998, pp.96-100; Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), Development Beyond Economics, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America  
2000 Report, Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 2000). As Auty & Gelb (2001) propose: 
“Natural resource endowments define and shape social groups as well as determine sectors of comparative 
 3
 
One important version of the idea that rentier states generate greater violence has been 
developed by Mick Moore.10 The logic of Moore’s model is as follows. The core argument is 
that contemporary rentier states, by relying on ‘unearned” income, do not deve lop a set of 
reciprocal obligations with citizens via the nexus of domestic taxation. Drawing on the work 
of Tilly,11 Moore compares the process of state formation in rentier states with the process of 
state formation in Europe. In the latter cases, state-making proceeded through two main 
processes: the threat of war through inter-state military competition; and an intrastate process 
of resource mobilization that involved explicit political bargains and relations between state 
rulers and interest groups. The latter process induced the creation of state-society links, 
markets, and bureaucratic capacity, including tax collection capacity. In the process of ‘war 
making states’, the nature of states changed. State leader’s despotic power was reduced, but 
their infrastructural power (capacity to penetrate society, to extract resources from it and co-
operate with social classes to achieve collective goals) increased. The interpretation that 
Moore, and others such as Karl and Reno, draw from this historical period is that the 
emergence of representative government, and more generally, of interdependence and mutual 
obligation and accountability between states and citizens is more likely when there are 
incentives and mechanisms for states to increase their revenues through domestic taxation, 
which, in turn, requires political bargaining with citizens.12  
 
Moore argues that the mechanisms through which state formation takes place in the poorest 
late developers, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, are very different from the European 
experience analyzed by Tilly. For one, states in sub-Saharan Africa have not been established 
by inter-state warfare, which rules out the possibility that external threat and Darwinian 
competition will shape state formation. 13  After 1945, legitimate successors to colonial rule 
were sufficient grounds for recognition of borders by the international community.  
 
However, the main difference, in contemporary late developers is the much greater 
availability of unearned income in the form of aid flows and mineral rents, which according 
to Moore generates a series of outcomes that worsens governance and increases the risk of 
political violence. The first outcome of increased unearned income is a growing 
independence of states from citizens. This increased autonomy of states from citizens can 
increase the ability of state leaders to act in predatory ways, or at the very least reduces the 
need for state leaders to develop long-run political bargains with interest groups. This, in 
turn, makes taxation and revenues more unpredictable, which may increase arbitrary 
confiscation when volatile mineral rents suddenly collapse. The second retarding effect on 
state capacity of unearned income is the decline in bureaucratic capacity. With little 
bureaucratic presence in tax collection and limited information about what goes on at the 
grassroots level, states may be vulnerable to organized predators including guerrillas and 
private armies. The third way mineral rents can aggravate the predatory nature of states is via 
the relative ease with which coercion can be purchased. Compared to 17th century Europe, 
                                                                                                                                                        
advantage; they also can imply a greater or lesser ‘natural’ share of revenue in the hands of a central authority” 
(p. 126). 
10 Mick Moore, ‘Death without taxes: democracy, state capacity and aide dependence in the fourth world’, in M. 
Robinson, and G. White (eds.), The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford 
Studies in Democratisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; and ‘Political Underdevelopment: what 
causes “Bad Governance”?’, Public Management Review, 3:3 (2001). 
11 C. Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’, in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; , Coercion, Capital, and European 
States, A.D. 990-1990, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990. 
12 Karl (1997) and W. Reno, ‘Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars’, in M. Berdal and D. 
Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
13 With the exception of the continent’s wars of independence. 
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mineral wealth provides financing possibilities for purchasing arms, which has become a 
more accessible market in the post-Cold War period. This reduced need for more labour-
intensive military operations supposedly increases the independence of state leaders from 
making bargains with a wider section of the citizenry. The risk of predation is thus increased 
in rentier states by the growing power of states vis-à-vis society and may lead to an increase 
in the militarization of politics.  
 
Supporters of the rentier state model suggest that reducing a state’s ‘unearned income’ from 
either mineral rents or international aid will enhance the prospects of peace. Policy 
recommendations include either reducing the levels of international aid and/or monitoring aid 
more effectively through conditionality;14 or avoiding extractive industries altogether and 
concentrating efforts in order to diversify mineral-dominant economies towards agriculture 
and manufacturing. 15  
 
There are several assumptions in the rentier state model that drive the results. First of all, 
leaders are implicitly assumed to “own” the natural resources, that is, they are assigned the 
‘property rights’ over resources. How rulers appropriate and maintain power is not 
adequately analysed. By assigning “rights” to leaders (whether in the state or civil society), 
the whole problematic of how “common pool resources” are managed is neglected, when the 
real problem of common pool resources is, in fact, analysing the processes through which 
rights are assigned, enforced, maintained and changed.16 In other words, it is assumed that 
there are no collective actors within the society that can impose some domestic conditionality 
on how those who occupy the state exercise their power.  
 
Second, leaders are assumed to have predatory as opposed to developmental aims. The 
neglect of the political processes through which a leader appropriates power limits our 
understanding of the motivations of state leaders. The state is not a thing, such as ‘a 
predator’, but a set of social relations. The existence of natural resource abundance does not 
preclude the possibility that state leaders share income from resource rents with groups that 
comprise their political support base. Even if it is assumed that the leader has absolute power 
and is thus the ‘owner’ or ‘residual claimant’17 in an economy, it does not necessarily follow 
that leaders will act in predatory ways. Following Olson, a leader that has a long time 
horizon, what he calls a ‘stationary bandit’, has the incentive to maximise the rate of 
economic growth as this will maximize the resources accruing to the state in the long-run. 18 A 
dictator who does not have to tax citizens to maintain power, still can rationally have 
developmental as opposed to predatory motivations. Predatory behaviour on the part of 
leaders - that is, making money out of perpetuating civil war - cannot be assumed or simply 
described, but needs to be explained. Predation will occur as a consequence of the failure to 
adopt much more lucrative and broad-based legitimacy-enhancing developmental aims. The 
decision of leaders to purposefully engage in rapacious acts to accumulate capital thus 
assumes that they have made a prior decision that long-run economic development is either 
                                                 
14 Moore (1998, 2001). 
15 M. Ross, ‘How Does Natural Resource Wealth Influence Civil War?’  Mimeo, Department of Political 
Science, UCLA (mlross@polisci.ucla.edu), 2001a. 
16 M. Ols on, The Theory of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965; G. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
17 In the neoclassical theory of the firm, the residual claimant refers to the firm owner (A. Alchain & H. 
Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, American Economic Review, 62, 1972). 
The firm owner in this theory is assigned the right to appropriate the residual, that is, profits, of the firm’s team 
production. According to this theory, private ownership of firms provides the incentives for owners to monitor 
team production efficiently.  
18 M. Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87  (1993). 
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undesirable or politically and/or economically infeasible. However, the conditions under 
which predatory behaviour dominates developmental behaviour in a mineral-dominant 
economy is not addressed in the rentier state model. 
 
Apart from Moore’s historical political economy perspective on the violence- inducing effects 
of predatory rentier states, mainstream economic analyses have also recently proposed that 
presence of mineral resource wealth increases the incidence, duration and intensity of civil 
wars.19  There are two mechanisms proposed about how this may occur. The first is a 
“looting” mechanism proposed by Collier and Hoeffler. If rebel organizations have the 
opportunity to extract and sell resources (or extort money from those who do), then they are 
more likely to launch a civil war.20 Collier and Hoeffler note that natural resources offer rebel 
groups a funding opportunity because they produce rents that are location-specific and can be 
looted on a sustained basis. The possibility of looting or extorting money from manufacturing 
firms is less because these firms are more mobile. The looting mechanism would suggest that 
rebel organizations should be raising money prior to the start of civil war, a prediction 
interestingly not borne out by the evidence.21 What is more important for the rentier state 
argument is that the looting mechanism is not so relevant since mineral rents are point 
resources, not diffuse, and thus should be less likely to be ‘lootable’. 22   
 
The second mechanism involves disputes or grievances over the distribution of mineral rents. 
There are several scholars who have found distributive conflicts generally increase the risk of 
civil war.23 If resource extraction leads to land expropriation, environmental damage and 
large-scale migration and displacement, then it is possible that extraction-related disputes 
could increase the risk of civil war.  
 
The idea that the mere existence of mineral rents necessarily generates greater conflict is 
consistent with mainstream theories of rent-seeking.24 Is it, however, necessarily the case that 
                                                 
19 Following on the work of J. Hirschleifer (‘The Dark Side of the Force’, Economic Inquiry, Jan 1994; ‘Conflict 
and Settlement’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 
London: Macmillan, 1987), P. Collier & A. Hoeffler, ‘On the Economic Consequences of War’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 50 (1998); Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Washington D.C:  World Bank, 2001; and P. 
Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War: an economic perspective’, in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds.), Greed and 
grievance: economic agendas in civil war. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000, develop models to show that war 
is more likely where the gains from the likelihood of victory outweigh the costs of co-ordinating a rebellion. 
20 Collier & Hoeffler (1998) estimate that the correlation between resource dependence and civil war is 
curvilinear, suggesting that  the risk of civil war declines when resource dependence reaches exceptionally high 
levels, at which point, “the increased tax revenue eventually augments the capacity of the government to defend 
itself sufficiently to offset the enhanced finances of the rebels.”  Other studies such as de Soysa (2000) find the 
relationship linear. 
21 Ross (2001a). 
22 P. Le Billion, ‘The Political Ecology of War: natural resources and armed conflicts’, Political Geography, 20  
(2001) argues that the type and location of resources matter for the duration (though not the incidence) of a civil 
war. The two main distinctions with respect to resources are: those that are close to the capital (and hence easier 
for governments to capture) and those that are distant (and hence easier for rebels to hold) and between “point 
source” resources which are concentrated in a small area (and therefore easily controlled by a single group) and 
“diffuse” resources which are scattered over a large area (and hence harder for any one group to capture). These 
two categories he suggests produce a fourfold typology of conflict: point resources near a capital create violent 
incentives to control the state and hence produce coup d’etats; point resources that are far from the capital 
produce secession movements; diffuse resources near the capital produce rebellions and rioting; and diffuse 
resource far from the capital lead to “warlordism”. 
23 J. Auvinen, ‘Political conflict in less developed countries 1981-1989’, Journal of Peace Research, 34:2 
(1997); W. Nafziger & J. Auvinen, ‘Economic Development, Inequality, War and State Violence’, World 
Development, 30:11 (2002). 
24 For a critical review of rent-seeking theories, see M. H. Khan,  ‘Rent-Seeking as a Process: Inputs, Rent-
Outcomes and Net Effects’, in Khan, M.K., and Jomo, K.S. (eds.),  Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic 
Development Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
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the increases in natural resource rents, of whatever type, induce increases in rent-seeking? 
The answer would depend on the political conditions that induce struggle in the first place 
and the relative power of competing groups to engage in rent-seeking struggles, including 
violent ones. One of the possible factors that may induce rent-seeking struggle could be a 
dispute over the distribution of rights and assets sanctioned by the state. If there is at least a 
passive acceptance of the distribution of rights and rents that emanate from mineral income, 
then rent-seeking struggles may be low. This means that the issue of political legitimacy 
needs to be central to any ana lysis of the impact of mineral abundance or rent-seeking on 
political outcomes, including patterns of conflict and violence. It is when the distribution of 
rights is perceived as illegitimate by significant groups within a society that conflict and 
violence becomes more likely. 25  It is not clear, a priori, why mineral-dominant economies 
generate a more unjust or illegitimate distribution of rights and income than non-mineral 
dominant economies. Even if it were the case that mineral economies generate a greater 
inequality of income, the evidence suggests that injustice and inequality do not inevitably 
generate conflict.26  
 
The possibility of violent rent-seeking activities also depends on the expectations of the 
combatants. Engaging in conflict requires collective action, which, in turn, requires that 
political entrepreneurs can persuade groups to support resistance and rebellion against the 
status quo. For this to happen, however, it is necessary for political entrepreneurs to mobilize 
the marginalized groups into a relevant political force. Because collective action is subject to 
problems of free-riding,27 there is no necessary reason that the opportunity to engage in rent-
seeking struggles will generate a collective response.28  If the organisational and collective 
capacity of a potential rebel group is low, then rent-seeking activities will, in turn, be low 
since the probability of victory is small. There is no reason to assume that mineral rents will 
generate a balance of political power that induces greater rent-seeking, including its violent 
manifestations.  
 
The Rentier state model and political violence: Is there convincing evidence? 
Several studies have found that natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. This 
would appear to support the idea that rentier states are more likely to generate violence. 
According to Collier and Hoeffler, the incidence of civil war increases with the dependence 
of a state on natural resource exports.29 In Collier and Hoeffler’s earlier work, natural 
resources include both agricultural and mineral exports.30 According to de Soysa, the 
                                                 
25  For a discussion of political legitimacy as passive acceptance of reigning institutional arrangements see J. 
Putzel, ‘Survival of an imperfect democracy in the Philippines’, Democratization, 6:1 (1997), pp.198-223. 
26 See Cramer (2002b), pp.1848-49 for review of evidence. 
27 Olson (1965). 
28 The problem of collective action may be reduced if it is possible for political leaders to frame inequalities and 
injustices along ethnic, regional or religious lines. When politics turns to framing conflicts along ethnic, regional 
and/or religious lines, conflicts over distribution of resources tend to become more indivisible, or of the ‘us 
versus them’ variety. Following A. Hirschman, ‘Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Societies’, in 
A. Hirschman, A Propensity to Self-Subversion, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, a conflict 
over resources is indivisible when assets or income are perceived as ‘either-or’. Divisible conflicts, on the other 
hand, are conflicts over getting ‘more or less’ (i.e. such as in the capital-labour struggle) and do not take on a 
‘winner-take -all’ characteristic. While it can be argued that indivisible conflicts may generate more violence 
because of the decisiveness that appropriating rents has on group welfare, there is again, no reason to assume 
that politics in mineral-dominant economies is necessarily framed in terms of indivisible conflicts over 
resources. 
29 Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2000).  In most of the studies cited, except De Soysa (2000), civil wars are defined 
as conflicts that a) occur within the recognized boundaries of a single state; b) involve combat between the state 
and at least one recognized rebel force; and c) result in at least one thousand combat-related deaths over some 
period of time, usually one year. 
30 Collier & Hoeffler (1998). 
 7
incidence of civil war is not correlated with the per capita availability of natural resources, 
defined as the stocks of both renewable resources and non-renewables.31 However, de Soysa 
does find that, once the independent variable of natural resources includes only mineral 
resources, the correlation with the incidence of civil war becomes highly significant. In 
Collier and Hoeffler’s later work, based on data covering the period 1960-1999, they find that 
a state that depends heavily on the export of oil and minerals faces a risk of civil war of 23 
percent for any given five-year period; an identical country with no natural resource exports 
has a civil war risk of just 0.5 percent.32 That is, in otherwise similar economies (controlling 
for income per capita, ethnic fragmentation, income inequality, etc), dependence on oil and/or 
minerals increases the risk of civil war by 46 times!  
    
A recent survey of the above evidence generates a more indeterminate picture. According to 
Ross, the incidence of civil wars in oil and gas exporters is not much greater than for other 
natural-resource exporters.33 In the period, 1990-2000, 32 out of 161 countries surveyed had 
civil wars; which means that for any random country, there was a 0.199 chance (i.e., 
approximately one in five) of a country suffering a civil war at some point in the 1990’s. 
Without controlling for income per capita, civil wars occurred at slightly lower rates among 
states that were highly dependent on resource exports in four different categories of resource 
dependence: oil and gas; other mineral exporters (not including gemstones); food crop 
exporters; and non-food crop exporters. When controlling for income per capita (that is by 
dividing the resource export-to-GDP ratios by each country’s income per capita producing a 
figure that simultaneously reflects both resource dependence and per capita wealth), then 
resource dependent countries appear to have a noticeably higher risk of civil war. However, 
there is no obvious difference among resource types—that is, all types of resource 
dependence seem to make conflicts more likely, once per capita income has been accounted 
for. This evidence does not support the rentier state hypothesis. Mineral-dominant poor 
economies seem no more prone to political violence than non-mineral-dominant natural 
resource exporting poor economies. 
 
There are, however, several methodological problems with the econometric evidence that 
makes it difficult to draw policy conclusions. The first concerns the very wide (and rather) 
arbitrary range in the definitions of what constitutes ‘war’ and ‘violence’ in the econometric 
studies. In the Collier and Hoeffler paper, a conflict is defined as 1,000 or more battle deaths 
in a year.34 This very high threshold of deaths makes the ‘event’ of war very rare and is really 
attempting to measure large-scale or very intensive wars. In the de Soysa study, conflict is 
measured at a much lower threshold of 25 battle-related deaths on the justification that a 
lower threshold will reflect better the nature of ‘eco-violence’ and/or criminalized violence.35 
 
It is thus an open question as to what the appropriate threshold of deaths should be to define a 
‘war, or ‘political violence’. Why, for example, should homicides that result from gang wars 
and drug-running mafia activities not count as ‘battle-related deaths’, and therefore, ‘war’. 
Gang murder, like tax evasion, is surely an instance of a failure to accept the political rules of 
the game (i.e. thou shall commit murder) and thus constitutes, in part, a rebellion against the 
institutional structure of the state. Furthermore, it is not clear that political violence only 
involves deaths related to rebellion against the state. Since the state is the set of institutions 
in charge of defending the rule of law, the inability of the state to defend citizens from violent 
                                                 
31 De Soysa (2000), pp.123-124. 
32 Collier & Hoeffler (2000). 
33 M. Ross,  (2002), ‘Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary Their Impact on Civil War?’  
Produced for the International Academy Project on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (mlross@polisci.ucla.edu), 
2002. 
34 Collier & Hoeffler (1998). 
35 De Soysa (2000).  
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aggression from other civil society members constitutes a form of ‘political’ violence. In 
many Latin American or South African cities (e.g. Sao Paulo, Medellin, Caracas, 
Johannesburg), the annual homicide rates generate more deaths per year than the minimum 
threshold of even 1,000 battle deaths per year used by Collier and Hoeffler.36 The absence of 
effective policing and the presence of the state (especially in shantytowns) and/or the right to 
possess a gun, both political issues, contribute to the death toll in these cities. In this sense, 
homicide is a type of ‘political’ violence or  ‘war’. Long ago, Hobbes pointed out that the 
source of conflict is largely a question of conflicts within civil society and not just between 
the state and civil society. State weakness can be as easily the source of violence as state 
predation. The methodology of defining categories is always open to (philo sophical) 
interpretation, and therefore, it is advisable to be extremely cautious in using any econometric 
study as the focal point of policy-making concerning political violence. 
 
The second concern is that correlation does not demonstrate causality. For instance, it is at 
least as probable that civil wars might produce or sustain resource dependence. This could 
occur if conflict raised transaction costs and risk and thus reduced the amount of 
manufacturing investment, which tends to have a longer gestation period. At the same time, 
the mineral investment may continue through conflict since the returns are higher given the 
higher level of ground rent and given that investment in the sector cannot flee because 
mineral resources are location-specific. Even though Collier and Hoeffler employ lagged 
independent variables in their regressions, this does not rule out reverse causality; since civil 
wars are not recognized as “beginning” until they have generated at least a thousand combat-
related deaths, they might be preceded by significant enough levels of violence and political 
conflict that is a disincentive to long-run manufacturing investment, generating a higher level 
of resource dependence before the civil war technically begins. 
 
The case of Angola in the 1960’s is instructive.37 According to Cramer, oil and diamonds had 
little to due with the onset of war in the 1960’s.38 Minerals were a very small part of total 
exports and gross domestic product at the onset of political conflict. War and policy-making 
in the 1960’s can be seen to have created a dependence on mineral exports. The Angolan 
economy was undergoing a dramatic structural change. Manufacturing accounted for 25 
percent of GDP by independence in 1961 and the late 1960’s and early 1970’s saw Angola 
achieve one of the most rapid manufacturing growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The onset 
of war along with inefficient industrial policies led to falls in agricultural and industrial 
production on the eve of oil windfalls in the early 1970’s. The direction of causality seems to 
be the reverse of that posited by the rentier state model. 39  
 
Third, the correlation could also be spurious since both civil war and mineral resource 
dependence might be independently caused by some missing third variable, such as weak rule 
of law, poor macroeconomic management, or corruption. A state where the rule of law is 
weak will also generate high transaction costs, which may reduce manufacturing or non-
mineral agricultural investment with long-gestation periods such as coffee. As a result, the 
economy may become more dependent on mineral exports. For instance, there is strong 
evidence that the onset of civil war in Angola made the economy more dependent on resource 
exports.40 To take another example, the weak rule of law in the mineral- rich Aceh province of 
Indonesia has both provided the opportunity for independence fighters to organize and 
                                                 
36 Collier & Hoeffler (1998). 
37 This paragraph draws primarily on Cramer (2002a), pp.13-14. 
38 Cramer (2002a). 
39This is not to deny that oil revenues allowed the MPLA in Angola to wage one of the most expensive civil 
wars in Africa, maintaining large armed forces and arms imports.  
40 W. Minter, ‘Apartheid’s contras: an inquiry into the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique’, London: Zed 
Books, 1994; Cramer (2002a). 
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undertake rebellions and has hindered the diversification of the economy. Violence in Aceh 
after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 followed nearly 35 years of relatively more 
peaceful (if surely coercive, and at times, brutal) forms of conflict containment and 
management during the Suharto regime. The failure to specify a model fully limits the 
possibility of explaining the cycles of violent and non-violent institutions of conflict 
settlement in a mineral-rich country or region. It is also possible that an economy might face 
an increased risk of civil war through a different process. The result could be a statistically-
significant correlation between resource-dependence and civil war even though neither factor 
would cause the other. 
 
Fourth, it is also possible that war may prevent an economy from becoming more resource 
abundant in the first place. If state leaders are to appropriate oil revenues, for instance, they 
need to secure and enforce property rights in the territory where there is oil. Oil rents, like all 
rents, themselves require the specification of rights, which do not occur naturally. Moreover, 
state leaders need to be able to either extract taxation from multinationals, or what is even 
more difficult, extract the mineral through public enterprise production. Wars can just as 
easily prevent a state becoming a more abundant mineral producer. The case of war 
preventing the further development of oil in the Sudan in the 1990’s is a case in point. In this 
case, the causality between resource abundance and war would be the opposite of the rentier 
state argument.  
 
Fifth, there is a neglect of the effect of prior wars as a cause of conflict. In the poorest region, 
sub-Saharan Africa (where most of the civil wars have occurred in the period 1960-1999), a 
main trait of many current conflicts is that they occur in countries or sub-regions that have 
had a previous conflict. Consider the following Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Persistence and Contagion: Wars in Africa, 1989-1999 
 
Country War before  War next door 
Angola Yes  Zaire/Congo 
Burundi (1970's)  Rwanda 
Congo-Brazzaville No  Zaire/Congo 
Djibouti No  All neighbours 
Guinea Bissau (1970's)  Casamance, Senegal 
Liberia No  No 
Mali (1960's)  Algeria, Mauritania 
Rwanda (1960's)  Uganda 
Senegal (Casmance) border wars  border wars 
Sierra Leone No  Liberia 
Somalia Yes  Ethiopia 
Sudan Yes  Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad 
Uganda insurrections Yes  Sudan, D.R. Congo 
Zaire/D.R. Congo (1960's, 70's)  Rwanda, Angola 
      
Border Wars 
Mauritania-Senegal yes (Mauritania)  Western Sahara 
Ethiopia-Eritrea yes (both)   Sudan, Somalia 
Source: De Waal, Who Fights? Who Cares?  War and Humanitarian Action in Africa, Trenton, NJ: 
Africa World Press, 2000), Table, p. 5 
 
In the period, 1989-1999, de Waal shows that there are two important elements of war in 
Africa: first is the persistence of war and second, wars are readily transmissible from one 
country to another. Of the sixteen cases of war de Waal highlights, seven had recent wars 
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before and a further five suffered wars within twenty years of their most recent conflict. 
Fifteen of the wars occurred in the countries where there was a recent war in a neighbouring 
country (the so-called ‘war next door’ syndrome). Only one case, Liberia, is an exception. Of 
these sixteen cases, seven cases (Burundi, Djibouti, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
and Ethiopia-Eritrea) were non-mineral dominant economies. The prevalence of the “wars 
before, war next door” syndrome in both mineral resource-rich and mineral-resource poor, 
suggest that the dynamics of persistence and contagion are the result of contingent issues of 
political economy. 41  
 
Sixth, all of the statistical stud ies discussed are guilty of selection bias. By definition, most 
countries that do not have a diversified agricultural and manufacturing base become mineral 
dependent. In historical terms, almost all countries began as mineral-dominant economies. 
For instance, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, and Malaysia 
were, in earlier stages of development, more mineral-dominant, less diversified economies. 
The key policy question to ask is why natural resource revenues are used in ways that sustain 
economic growth and diversification in some countries and not in others. Lack of economic 
diversification and poor economic growth are why economies are mineral dependent. If that 
is the case, then it makes sense to ask why political conflicts prevented growth in some 
mineral dependent economies and not in others. This is also an important problematic 
because the majority of countries suffering civil wars and humanitarian emergencies have 
experienced several years, or even decades, of prolonged stagna tion and/or decline in 
economic growth. 42 In the period 1980-1991, 40 of 58 (69%) African and Asian countries 
experienced negative growth. In contrast, only 9 of 53 had experienced negative growth in 
the period 1960-1980.43  While it is a complex issue to explain why there is such a difference 
in this total between periods, one economic factor has been the deflationary impact of 
structural adjustment programs throughout the region. An important political factor has been 
the end of the regulation of the arms trade after the Cold War.  
 
What is even more devastating for the resource curse argument is that, even when allowing 
for selection bias, it is not the case that there is any determinate relationship between the 
incidence of civil war and humanitarian emergencies and mineral dependence. Consider 
Table 2: 
                                                 
41 A. de Waal, Who Fights? Who Cares?  War and Humanitarian Action in Africa, Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, 2000, pp.1-34. 
42 Nafziger & Auvinen (2002), p.155. 
43 Nafziger & Auvinen (2002), p.155.  There are several factors that may have contributed to this: a) poor and 
declining agricultural export growth, b) increasing debt burdens, and c) the deflationary impact of ongoing 
structural adjustment policies. On the last point, see P. Mosely, T. Subasat & J. Weeks, ‘Assessing Adjustment 
in Africa’, World Development, 23:9 (1995);  UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Trade 
and Development Report’, Geneva: United Nations, 1998;and  J. Sender, ‘Reassessing the Role of the World 
Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in J. Pincus and J. Winters (eds.) Reinventing the World Bank . Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002. 
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Table 2. War Casualties in Humanitarian Emergencies (1992-1994) in Mineral Dominant 
Economies  and Non-Mineral Dominant Economies 
 
  Mineral/fuel exports, 1980 Number of Casualties 
  (% total exports)   
Natural Resource- dominant Countries  
Angola  90+ %  100,000   
Liberia  45  20,000-50,000   
Afghanistan 40  6,000   
Peru  64  3,100   
Algeria  98  2,000-3,000   
Iraq  98  2,000   
Azerbaijan  90+  2,000-7,000   
Non-Mineral Dominant Countries  
Rwanda  4%  200,000-500,000   
Burundi  0  100,000   
Mozambique 7  100,000   
Bosnia-Herzegovina na  10,000-30,000   
Croatia  <10  10,000   
Sudan  2  6,000   
Somalia  0  6,000   
Tajikistan  <10  4,000-30,000   
Sri Lanka  15  4,000   
Turkey  8  4,000   
Colo mbia  3  3,500   
South Africa 11  3,000-4,000   
Georgia  na  2,000   
Guatemala  6  2,000   
Myanmar   11   2,000   
Source: Nafziger (1996), Table 1, p.2; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000 
 
Table 2 divides countries that were experiencing a complex emergency in the period 1992-
1994 into mineral-dominant and non-mineral dominant economies. Of the 22 countries that 
had a complex emergency in that period, only 7 were mineral-dominant export economies. In 
terms of number of casualties in absolute terms, the non-mineral dominant economies 
experienced far more casualties than the mineral-dominant economies, which does not 
support the case that the intensity of civil conflict is likely to be greater in mineral-dominant 
economies. 
 
A similar story on the indeterminacy of resource abundance on the incidence and intensity of 
civil conflict emerges when we examine the number of refugees and internally displaced 
persons in 1995, a year when comparative data is available. Consider Table 3: 
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Table 3.  Refugees and Internally Displaced People (1995) in Mineral Dominant and Non-
Mineral Dominant Economies 
 
  Mineral/fuel Refugees Internally Total Share of total 
  exports, 1980  displaced  Population 
  
(% total 
exports)  persons  (%)  
Mineral Dominant Economies 
  
Afghanistan 40%  2, 328,000 500,000 2,828,000 14.1   
Angola  90+  313,000 1,500,000 1,813,000 16.4   
Liberia  45  725,000 1,000,000 1,725,000 56.7   
Iraq  98  623,000 1,000,000 1,623,000 8.0   
Sierra Leone 34  363,000 1,000,000 1,363,000 30.2   
Azerbaijan  90+  390,000 670,000 1,060,000 14.0   
Peru   64   na 480,000 480,000 2.0   
Non-Mineral Dominant Economies 
  
Bosnia-Herzegovina na  906,000 1,300,000 2,206,000 63.0   
Sudan  2%  448,000 1,700,000 2,148,000 7.6   
Rwanda  400%  1,545,000 500,000 2,045,000 25.7   
Turkey  8  15,000 2,000,000 2,015,000 3.3   
Sri Lanka  15  96,000 1,000,000 1,096,000 6.0   
Myanmar  11  160,000 750,000 910,000 2.0   
Somalia  0  480,000 300,000 780,000 8.4   
Ethiopia  8  500,000 111,000 611,000 1.1   
Colombia  3  na 600,000 600,000 1.7   
Mozambique 7  97,000 500,000 597,000 3.7   
Eritrea  <10  325,000 200,000 525,000 14.9   
South Africa 11  10,000 500,000 510,000 1.2   
Burundi  0  290,000 216,000 506,000 7.9   
Tajikistan  <10  174,000 300,000 474,000 7.8   
Croatia  <10  200,000 225,000 425,000 9.6   
Lebanon  <10  na 400,000 400,000 13.2   
Armenia  <20  200,000 185,000 385,000 10.7   
Georgia   <10   105,000 280,000 385,000 7.1   
Source: Nafziger (1996), Table 2, p.3; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000   
 
Of the 25 countries that generated the greatest number of refugees and internally displaced 
people, only 7 were in mineral-dominant economies. Of the cases where the total number of 
refugees and internally displace persons exceeded 10 percent of the population, both groups 
of economies had 5 cases each. This small sample corroborates evidence that when a conflict 
does occur, it is likely to be more intense in mineral-dominant economy.44 Nevertheless, there 
is no evidence that the likelihood of a conflict is greater in mineral-dominant economies—




In sum, there seems to be little convincing evidence that mineral abundance per se causes 
conflict although there is some evidence that once a conflict is underway, some types of 
natural resources may facilitate the prolongation of war. The evidence thus suggests that 
factor endowments do not determine politics. The indeterminacy of natural resource wealth 
                                                 
44 Ross, 2001. 
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and violence suggests that the nature of conflicts in mineral-dominant economies does not 
exist prior to politics. Because political bargaining surrounding common pool mineral rents is 
historically specific, the case study and comparative political economy approach will be 
useful in furthering our understanding of political violence in poor economies.  
 
A historically grounded research on the origins and nature of political organizations and their 
support base may enable us to develop a framework for understanding the extent to which 
conflict becomes more or less divisible.45 A systematic analysis of competing political party 
strategies and their effects in generating more or less divisible parameters of contestation 
should prove useful. The advantage of the case-study and comparative approach over the 
variable-oriented approaches is significant. The salience and intensity of ethnic, regional 
and/or religious cleavages is contingent on political party organization, co-optation and other 
strategies. Collier’s and Moore’s approaches cannot accommodate these important 
contingencies, sequences of action and interactions of political action. The most influential 
models of conflict do not examine important relationships between political parties and the 
state, the structural characteristics of inter and intra-party competition, and as such, cannot 
illuminate historically specific processes of conflict/cleavages in a given society. Ethnic 
conflict and natural resource plunder do not, like class, exist prior to politics. 
 
The indeterminacy of natural resource abundance on conflict also suggests that examining 
historically specific processes of political conflict and conflict management in economies and 
the effect these processes have on economic growth and diversification defines a major 
research agenda to understand the genealogy of war in poor economies. Given the importance 
of low per capita income and economic decline in increasing the risk of war, I will examine, 
in a companion paper, the possibility that mineral resource abundance leads to conflict by 
perpetua ting growth-restricting governance, Dutch Disease, and underdevelopment. While 
there may be nothing more practical than a good theory, it is clear that simplistic and 
deterministic theories of resource abundance, as posited in the rentier state model, do not 
adequately capture the range and interaction of factors that constitute a complex emergency. 
The focus on the role of natural resource abundance as a cause of conflict simply delves 
deeply into the surface of conflicts in poor economies. As a result, the rentier state model, 
while useful in bringing issues of the source of taxation and resource mobilization back into a 
discussion of state capacity and accountability, is an inadequate framework and guide for 
more profound, penetrating and lasting interventions to peace-building, state capacity-
building and economic reconstruction in conflict-ridden societies. 
 
Finally, if it is reasonable to conclude that politics and policy have been decisive to the 
trajectory of mineral-dominant economies, then several policy implications may be 
suggested. The first is that more effective intervention in humanitarian emergencies will 
require an account of the causes of conflict that move beyond economic and factor 
endowment determinism. Second, attention should shift toward understanding how past 
government policies affect the processes of growth and diversification of mineral-dominant 
economies. Very negative economic performance surely contributes to undermining regime 
and government legitimacy and therefore may increase widespread support for abrupt and 
even violent changes. Third, greater attention should be paid to understanding the political 
economy dynamics of regional war zones that transcend the nation-state. The econometric 
evidence focuses on the nation-state as the unit of analysis. This misses the importance of 
how easily war can spill over into neighbouring countries and perpetuate what Wallensteen 
                                                 
45 See A. Hirschman, ‘Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Societies’, in A. Hirschman, A 
Propensity to Self-Subversion, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995 on divisibility. 
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and Sollenberg call “regional conflict complexes”.46  Fourth, more attention might be paid to 
the patterns of the arms trade and the extent to which changing patterns of production and 
distribution of arms in the post-Cold War period exacerbates ongoing violent conflicts in 
mineral dependent and more diversified economies. 
 
                                                 
46 P. Wallensteen & M. Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97’, Journal of 
Peace Research, 35:5 (1998). 
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